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Comment
Back Up and Hit Him Again: Illinois' Problem
with Parental Consortium Lost Because

of Nonfatal Injury
I. INTRODUCTION

Children in Illinois benefit if tortfeasors kill, rather than severely
injure, the children's parents. This paradox exists because, under
Illinois law, children can recover loss of consortium' damages for the
wrongful death of a parent but not for nonfatal injury to a parent, no
matter how severe.2 This situation calls to mind a tongue in cheek
illustration sometimes used to illustrate the common law approach to
wrongful death recovery.3
In the illustration, a motorist strikes and injures a pedestrian, and the
motorist's lawyer advises him to "back up and hit him again.",4 The
lawyer gives such advice because the common law permitted no recovery for the death of a human being.5 Consequently, following the
lawyer's advice put the motorist in a better economic position than the
motorist would have been in had he only injured the pedestrian.6
Similarly, in Illinois, children benefit economically if tortfeasors back
up and hit their parents again because they may then recover for loss of
consortium damages. However, just as the lawyer's advice in the
above illustration is absurd, Illinois' position on loss of parental
consortium in the case of nonfatal injury is equally absurd.
A significant minority of American states permit children to recover

I. Consortium,
relations.

or society, is defined as service, companionship, affection, or sexual

2 DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES-EQUITY-RESTITUTION §

8.1(5), at 400 (2d ed. 1993). Parental consortium is often more precisely defined to
include training, guidance, and discipline. 2 id. § 8.1(5), at 403.
2. See infra part III.
3. Professor Frank M. Covey, Jr., Lecture in Torts II at Loyola University of Chicago
School of Law (Spring 1992).

4. Id.
5.

Id.; see also infra note 25.

6.

See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 127, at

945 (5th ed. 1984).
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for loss of parental consortium because of nonfatal injury.7 A majority
of states, including Illinois, deny children such recovery without
adequate justification.' This Comment first traces the development of
the consortium claim at English and American common law and then in
Illinois. 9 It next examines current Illinois law on the question of
whether children may recover for loss of parental consortium because
of nonfatal injury.'0 Finally, the Comment surveys cases from
American states that permit the "children's claim""
and proposes that
2
Illinois courts adopt this emerging position.
II. BACKGROUND
The common law developed primarily to protect interests of persons
and property. 3 Nevertheless, it also recognized certain relational
interests. 4 The common law often protected relational interests, such
as the interest in one's familial relationships under the guise of
protecting property. 5 Under the modern view, however, family
relationships transcend any notion of property rights and are valuable
in and of themselves.
Although English common law originally allowed recovery for loss
of consortium only for a master's loss of his servant's labor, 6 courts
eventually expanded the claim to permit men to recover for loss of
7. See infra note 91.
8. See infra note 38.
9. See infra part II.
10. See infra part III.
l1. See infra part IV. For brevity, the children's claim for loss of parental
consortium because of nonfatal injury will be referred to as the "children's claim."
12. See infra part V.
13. Leon Green, Basic Concepts: Persons, Property, Relations, 24 A.B.A.J. 65, 65
(1938). Green lists four types of relational interests: family relations; trade relations;
political and professional relations; and general social relations. Id. at 66.
14. Blackstone recognized "three great relations in private life ....
That of master
and servant; . . . . That of husband and wife; .... That of parent and child." 1 W.
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *422.
15. Green, supra note 13, at 65-66. Courts considered relational interests as property
largely because of the conflict between courts of law and courts of equity. Id. at 65.
When suits to vindicate relational interests were brought before courts of equity, the
chancellors often found it convenient to characterize the interests at stake as property
interests because equity jurisdiction was limited to suits involving property. Id.; see
also Abernethy v. Hutchinson, 47 Eng. Rep. 1313, 1313 (Ch. 1825) (enjoining publication of notes taken of the plaintiff's oral lectures as a violation of his property interest in the lecture); Gee v. Pritchard, 36 Eng. Rep. 670, 670 (Ch. 1818) (enjoining
publication of the plaintiffs letters to the defendant based on the plaintiff's property
interest in them).
16. See infra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.

1994]

Loss of Parental Consortium for Nonfatal Injuries

547

consortium because of injury inflicted upon their wives 7 and children. 18 This section describes the development of the consortium
claim at English and American common law' 9 and its subsequent
development in Illinois. °
A. At English and American Common Law
The right to recover for loss of consortium originally arose within
the context of the master-servant relationship. 2' When the master lost
the servant's labor because of injury, English common law courts
permitted the master to recover the value of the servant's labor from
the tortfeasor.2 2 Courts considered loss of service essential to the
master's action. 23 As an extension of the master's action, fathers were
permitted to recover damages for service lost because of injury to their

1 7. See infra notes 25-30 and accompanying text.
1 8. See infra note 24 and accompanying text.
19. See infra part H.A.
20. See infra part ll.B.
21. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 6, § 125, at 931; see also Hall v. Hollander, 107
Eng. Rep. 1206, 1206 (K.B. 1825) (denying a parent recovery for injury to a 2 1/2 yearold son because the child was too young to render service); John H. Wigmore,
Interference with Social Relations, 21 AM. L. REV. 764, 765 (1887).
22. Wigmore, supra note 21, at 765. Wigmore reports that the master's action for
lost service already existed by the reign of Henry III (1216-1272). Id.; see also PROSSER
& KEETON, supra note 6, § 125, at 93 1.
23.

PETER B. KUTNER & OSBOURNE M. REYNOLDS, JR., ADVANCED TORTS: CASES AND

MATERIALS 26 n.l (1989). Although the master enjoyed a suit for lost service, the
servant retained the right to bring his own suit. Wigmore, supra note 21, at 765. The
Ordinance of Labourers, 1349, 23 Edw. 3 (Eng.), underscores the importance of service
in English society during this period. Enacted the year after the plague swept England,
the Ordinance reflects the severe labor shortage that existed. It prohibited, among other
things, enticing a servant away from his master. MARK A. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., CASES AND
MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 14-15 (2d ed. 199 1).
A few modern American cases permit the historic English action of a master's recovery
for lost service, known at common law as an action per quod servitium amisit. See, e.g.,
Jones v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 155 F.2d 992, 1000 (3d Cir. 1946) (holding that
an employer may recover its payment of a seaman's medical expenses for injuries
suffered because of the defendant's failure to maintain a pier); Darmour Prods. Corp. v.
Herbert M. Baruch Corp., 27 P.2d 664, 665 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1933) (holding that a
movie producer may recover for an actress' lost service when defendant negligently
injured her). American courts, however, currently tend to deny employers recovery in
this situation. See, e.g., Mattingly v. Sheldon Jackson College, 743 P.2d 356, 363
(Alaska 1987); Annotation, Employer's Right of Action for Loss of Services or the Like
Against Third Person Tortiously Killing or Injuring Employee, 4 A.L.R. 4TH 504
(1981); Warren A. Seavey, Liability to Master for Negligent Harm to Servant, 1956
WASH. U. L.Q. 309, 311.
In 1982, England abolished by statute the master's right to recover for a servant's
labor. Administration of Justice Act, 1982, ch. 53, § 2 (Eng. & N. Ir.).
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children.24
By 1618, English courts permitted husbands to recover for loss of
consortium because of negligent or intentional injury to their wives.
As with the master-servant and parent-child relationships, courts originally limited recovery for injury to the marital relationship to the value
of lost services.26 This limited recognition of the husband's right to
recover for loss of his wife's services laid the foundation for later
change.
By the late nineteenth century, courts also permitted husbands to
recover for emotional injuries, such as loss of companionship, society,
and comfort. 28 These emotional elements soon became the dominant
theme of consortium; the lost services became just another aspect of
consortium.29 In time, courts permitted husbands to recover for lost
spousal consortium absent any showing of lost services.30 Yet courts
denied wives recovery for loss of consortium because of nonfatal
injuries to their husbands. 3t Today, however, most American states
24. Wigmore, supra note 21, at 768-69; see also Laurie J. Barsella, Comment,
Negligent Injury to Family Relationships: A Reevaluation of the Logic of Liability, 77
Nw. U. L. REV. 794, 799 (1983). The father as paterfamilias enjoyed an absolute right
to the custody, care, education, and discipline of his children, even to the exclusion of
the mother. Harry M. Fisher, Pater Familias-A Cooperative Enterprise, 41 ILL. L. REV.
27, 31 (1946). A father's recovery for injuries to his child was considered analogous to
recovery for injuries to a servant because the father was legally entitled to the child's
service. KUTNER & REYNOLDS, supra note 23, at 26 n.l.
25. See Hyde v. Scyssor, 79 Eng. Rep. 462, 462 (K.B. 1619); Guy v. Livesey, 79
Eng. Rep. 428, 428 (K.B. 1618). Hyde and Guy are among the earliest cases recognizing a husband's right to recover for lost spousal consortium. Note that courts at
common law recognized no action for wrongful death. See KUTNER & REYNOLDS, supra
note 23, at 57 n.1; see also Baker v. Bolton, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033, 1033 (K.B. 1808)
("In a civil Court, the death of a human being could not be complained of as an injury;
and in this case the damages, as to the plaintiffs wife, must stop with the period of her
existence."). An action for wrongful death was not recognized in England until the
passage of Lord Campbell's Act (Fatal Accidents Act), 1846, 9 & 10 Vict., ch. 93
(Eng.). All American states have since enacted a version of Lord Campbell's Act.
KUTNER & REYNOLDS, supra note 23, at 59 n.6.
26. Maureen Ann Delaney, Comment, What About the Children? Toward an
Expansion of Loss of Consortium Recovery in the District of Columbia, 41 AM. U. L.
REV. 107, 112-13 (1991).
2 7. See David P. Dwork, Comment, The Child's Right to Sue for Loss of a Parent's
Love, Care and Companionship Caused by Tortious Injury to the Parent,56 B.U. L. REV.
722, 724 (1976) (discussing the evolution of the consortium claim from the husband's
claim for lost service).
28. Delaney, supra note 26, at 112-13; see also Dwork, supra note 27, at 724.
29. Delaney, supra note 26, at 113; see also Dwork, supra note 27, at 724.
30. Delaney, supra note 26, at 113; see also Dwork, supra note 27, at 724.
3 1. Married women could not bring an action at common law because they lacked
independent legal status; their legal personality merged with their husband's. Dwork,
supra note 27, at 724-25. Thus, Blackstone described the interests of husbands
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permit women to recover for lost spousal consortium.32
B. In Illinois

Like many American states, Illinois adopted the common law of
England by statute. 3 Thus, Illinois courts, like those in all other
American jurisdictions, permitted husbands to recover damages for
lost spousal consortium 34 but denied women a similar right of
recovery.35 Then in Dini v. Naiditch,36 the Illinois Supreme Court
("superiors") and wives ("inferiors") as follows: "[T]he inferior hath no kind of property
in the company, care, or assistance of the superior, as the superior is held to have in
those of the inferior .. " 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES * 143.
32. 2 DOBBS, supra note I, § 8.1(5), at 400. The leading case is Hitaffer v. Argonne
Co., 183 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 852 (1950), overruled on other
grounds, Smither & Co. v. Coles, 242 F.2d 220 (D.C. Cir. 1957). Hitaffer is the first
American decision permitting women to recover damages for loss of spousal consortium
because of injury to the husband. KUTNER & REYNOLDS, supra note 23, at 17 n.3.
PROSSER & KEETON lists Kansas and Virginia as two states that deny an action for loss of
consortium caused by personal injury to either spouse. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 6,
§ 125, at 932 n.10 (citing Taylor v. S.H. Kress & Co., 12 P.2d 808, 809 (Kan. 1932));
Floyd v. Miller, 57 S.E.2d 114, 117 (Va. 1950)); see also Shuder v. McDonald's Corp.,
859 F.2d 266, 273 n.4 (3d Cir. 1988) (stipulating no recovery for lost spousal consortium under Virginia law).
Most states deny a consortium claim for injury to a member of an unmarried couple
even if they are engaged. KUTNER & REYNOLDS, supra note 23, at 39 n.1; see also
Hendrix v. General Motors Corp., 193 Cal. Rptr. 922, 923 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983)
(holding that an unmarried cohabitant may not recover loss of consortium damages);
Sostock v. Reiss, 415 N.E.2d 1094, 1098 (II!. App. Ct. 1980) (holding that a member
of an engaged couple could not recover loss of consortium damages).
33. See Common Law Act, ILL. COMP. STAT. ch. 5, § 50/1 (West 1993) (originally
enacted in 1845).
34. See, e.g., Nixon v. Ludlam, 50 Ill. App. 273, 275-76 (1893) (holding that a
husband may recover damages for his wife's lost service because of a negligently
performed operation).
35. See Patelski v. Snyder, 179 II1. App. 24, 26 (1913) (denying a wife recovery for
loss of consortium because of nonfatal injury to her husband); see also Seymour v.
Union News Co., 217 F.2d 168, 169 (7th Cir. 1954) (following Patelski).
Interestingly, Illinois courts had earlier permitted wives to recover for loss of spousal
consortium due to the alienation of the husband's affections. See, e.g., Betser v. Betser,
58 N.E. 249, 250 (II1. 1900); Bassett v. Bassett, 20 Ill. App. 543, 547 (1886). Those
courts recognized the inconsistency of the earlier rule permitting husbands to recover
damages for loss of consortium because of alienation of the wife's affections while
denying that claim to women. In Bassett, for example, Justice Pillsbury observed that
"it seems there never was any valid reason for holding that the loss of the consortium of
the husband was any less an injury to the wife than the loss of the wife was to the
husband." 20 III. App. at 547.
Most states passed legislation generically known as "Married Women's Acts" in the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Barsella, supra note 24, at 797. Those
statutes generally empowered women to sue and be sued, own property, execute
contracts, and keep their own wages. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 6, § 122, at 902.
These statutes are collected in 3 CHESTER G. VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS § 167, at
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finally recognized a woman's right to recover for loss of spousal
consortium because of nonfatal injury.37
III. DISCUSSION

Since Dini, Illinois courts have declined to expand recovery of
consortium damages for nonfatal injury to the filial relationship. 8 In
171-83 (3d ed. 1935). See, e.g., An Act to Revise the Law in Relation to Husband and
Wife, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68, § 1 (1874). That act amended an earlier statute, An Act to
Protect Married Women in Their Separate Property, 1861 ILL. LAWS 143 (codified as
amended at ILL. COMP. STAT. ch. 750, § 65/9 (West 1993)), which allowed women to sue
in their own names. Some courts interpreted Married Women's Acts as abolishing
husbands' recovery for spousal consortium. See, e.g., Marri v. Stamford St. R.R., 78 A.
582, 587 (Conn. 1911), overruled by Hopson v. St. Mary's Hosp., 408 A.2d 260, 265
(Conn. 1979).
Most courts, however, held that the husband's consortium claim survived the Married
Women's Acts. See, e.g., Brahan v. Meridian Light & Ry., 83 So. 467, 468 (Miss.
1919). In those states, the only change due to the Married Women's Acts was that any
claim for the wife's lost wages or earning capacity was to be recovered in her own
action. Evans Holbrook, The Change in the Meaning of Consortium, 22 MICH. L. REV.
1, 7-8 (1923).
36. 170 N.E.2d 881 (Il1. 1960).
37. Id. at 893. The plaintiff's husband in Dini was a Chicago fireman who suffered
severe bums in a fire that started because of the defendants' negligence. Id. at 882-84.
The Dini court noted that Patelski was the only other reported Illinois decision considering whether women may recover spousal consortium. Id. at 888.
38. Illinois follows the position taken by a majority of American states. See 2
STUART M. SPEISER ET AL., THE AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS § 8:23, at 590 (1985).
American courts have offered the following reasons for denying children recovery for
loss of consortium because of nonfatal injury to a parent: (1) the danger of double recovery; (2) the remoteness or speculative nature of damages; (3) the difficulty in
apportioning damages among children; (4) an undue increase in the number of lawsuits;
(5) an adverse impact upon families; (6) the need for legislatures, rather than courts, to
speak to this issue; and (7) the inadequacy of damages or the judicial system in general to
provide adequate compensation to children for such a loss. 2 id. § 8:23, at 590-91.
The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS echoes the majority view: "One who by reason of
his tortious conduct is liable to a parent for illness or other bodily harm is not liable to a
minor child for resulting loss of parental support and care."

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF

TORTS § 707A (1977). The American Law Institute ("ALl") explains that the child's
interest in parental consortium is weaker than an adult's interest in spousal consortium,
and that permitting children to recover for parental consortium increases the probability
of overlap between the injured parent's and the child's recovery. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 707A cmt. a (1977). The following colloquy shows the ALI's discussion
before adopting § 707A:
DEAN PROSSER: Well, I gather that nobody wants to reverse the position of
707A and allow the child to recover for loss of the equivalent of consortium
when the father or mother is personally injured. One federal case in Hawaii did
that once, and presently got reversed when the state law changed, and all of the
cases have refused to allow recovery, so we would have no case support whatever for taking the position that the action would lie.
I don't hear any voices uplifted in favor of reversing 707A, so I would
assume that it is approved, and proceed.
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Koskela v. Martin,3 9 the Illinois Appellate Court expressly rejected the
children's claim. 4° LeAnn Koskela, a minor, sought to recover loss of
consortium damages resulting from injuries her father suffered in a
collision between his car and a garbage truck.4' She alleged that she
was especially dependent upon her father because of her mother's ill
health and because she suffered from autism. 4 2 The trial court
dismissed the consortium count of the daughter's complaint for failure
to state a cause of action.43
The appellate court affirmed the dismissal of the daughter's consortium claim for several reasons. 44 Noting that the plaintiff requested the
court to recognize a new cause of action in Illinois, 45 it urged that
"[t]his action, like the wrongful death and the alienation of affections
actions, would best be provided by the legislature so that all aspects
are considered and protected., 46 The court reasoned that even if
damages could compensate children for impairment of the filial
PRESIDENT DARREL: Is there any comment on 707A?
MR ELDREDGE: I move its adoption.
PRESIDENT DARREL: Maybe it isn't necessary. There is no opposition to it,
so we will assume that it is approved tentatively.
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, 1969 JOURNAL OF PROCEEDINGS 179. Dean Prosser refers
above to Scruggs v. Meredith, 134 F. Supp. 868 (D. Haw. 1955), rev'd, 244 F.2d 604
(9th Cir. 1957), in light of Halberg v. Young, 41 Haw. 634 (1957).
Prosser later criticized the void in the law which § 707A condones:
The interest of the child in proper parental care has run into a stone wall where
there is merely negligent injury to the parent.
It is not easy to understand and appreciate this reluctance to compensate the
child who has been deprived of the care, companionship and education of his
mother, or for that matter his father, through the defendant's negligence. This
is surely a genuine injury, and a serious one, which has received a great deal
more sympathy from the legal writers than from the judges.
WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 125, at 896 (4th ed. 1971)
(footnotes omitted).
39. 414 N.E.2d 1148 (Il1. App. Ct. 1980).
40. Id. at 1152.
41. Id. at 1149. Although the opinion does not state whether Mr. Koskela suffered
permanent disability, it lists his injuries as contusions, lacerations, broken bones, and
aggravation to pre-existing ailments. Id.
42. Koskela, 414 N.E.2d at 1149. The daughter specifically alleged that she suffered
not only because the father's injuries prevented him from providing her with love, affection, and guidance, but also because he could no longer drive her to a special education
class. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 1150-52.
45. Id. at 1150. The plaintiff asked the court to go beyond the most recent expansion
of the consortium claim in Dini v. Naiditch, 170 N.E.2d 881 (Il. 1960). Koskela, 414
N.E.2d at 1150. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text for a discussion of Dini.
46. Koskela, 414 N.E.2d at 1150.
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relationship, the intangible nature of consortium made damages for
loss of consortium difficult to calculate.47 The court also expressed
concern that the injured parent's damages and the child's consortium
damages might overlap.4 For example, the court hypothesized that a
jury might award a parent damages for lost future earnings but also
increase a child's consortium award by the amount of financial support
the child would have received from the parent but for the injury.49
Finally, the court observed that permitting the children's claim would
increase litigation and consequently place a financial burden on
society.5"
Later appellate court decisions that deny the children's claim place
varying degrees of emphasis on the reasons set forth in Koskela.5'
Courts from other states that deny children recovery for loss of
parental consortium because of nonfatal injury rely on the same or
similar reasons as those advanced in Koskela.52
Although the Illinois Supreme Court has yet to decide whether
children can recover damages for loss of parental consortium because
of nonfatal injury, it recently decided the converse question. In Dralle

47. Id. at 1151.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Koskela, 414 N.E.2d at 1151. The Koskela court stated three additional reasons
for its holding. First, it opined that courts had historically permitted the consortium
claim primarily to compensate married couples for the impairment or destruction of their
sex lives. Id. Second, the court noted that recognition of this cause of action would be
unprecedented. Id. Third, it chose to follow the majority of states, which deny children
recovery for loss of parental consortium because of nonfatal injury. Id.
Moreover, the Koskela court rejected the plaintiff's argument that Article 1, § 12 of the
Illinois Constitution requires the creation of the children's claim. Koskela, 414 N.E.2d
at 1152. Although that section of the constitution states that every person should enjoy
a remedy for injury to person or property, the court noted that the Illinois Supreme Court
has held that § 12 and its predecessors state only a philosophy, rather than a mandate for
any specific remedy. Koskela, 414 N.E.2d at 1152 (citing Sullivan v. Midlothian Park
Dist., 281 N.E.2d 659, 662 (II1. 1972)).
5 1. See, e.g., Van De Veire v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 533 N.E.2d 994 (111. App. Ct.
1989); Hearn v. Beelman Truck Co., 507 N.E.2d 1295 (111. App. Ct.), appeal denied, 515
N.E.2d 108 (I11. 1987); Huter v. Ekman, 484 N.E.2d 1224 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985); Block v.
Pielet Bros. Scrap & Metal, 457 N.E.2d 509 (II1. App. Ct. 1983); Mueller v. Hellrung
Const. Co., 437 N.E.2d 789 (111. App. Ct. 1982); McNeil v. Diffenbaugh, 434 N.E.2d
377 (II1. App. Ct. 1982).
52. See, e.g., Borer v. American Airlines, 563 P.2d 858 (Cal. 1977); Zorzos v.
Rosen, 467 So. 2d 305 (Fla. 1985); Powell v. American Motors Corp., 834 S.W.2d 184
(Mo. 1992); DeAngelis v. Lutheran Medical Ctr., 449 N.E.2d 406 (N.Y. 1983); High v.
Howard, 592 N.E.2d 818 (Ohio 1992); Norwest v. Presbyterian Intercommunity Hosp.,
652 P.2d 318 (Or. 1982). Norwest provides the most detailed discussion of the reasons
for denying the children's consortium claim. See 652 P.2d at 319-31.
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v. Ruder,5 3 the supreme court held that a parent cannot recover loss of
consortium damages for nonfatal injuries to a child.m
In Dralle, the plaintiffs' son was born with severe birth defects,
including brain damage. 55 The parents alleged that their obstetricians'
negligence and the medication the mother took during pregnancy
caused the defects. 6 The trial court dismissed the parents' claim for
loss of consortium and the appellate court reversed.57
On review, the supreme court acknowledged that it had earlier
recognized parents' recovery of consortium damages for the wrongful
death of a child,5 8 but declined to extend parents' consortium recovery
to cases of nonfatal injury. 59 The court reasoned that the primary
distinction between a loss of society claim in a wrongful death action
and the same claim in an action based on a nonfatal injury is that the
nonfatally injured victim retains his own cause of action against the
tortfeasor. 60 Thus, for cases of nonfatal injury, the court saw no
danger that the wrongdoer could avoid compensating the victim or that
similar tortious conduct would go undeterred. 6' An action under the
Wrongful Death Act, on the other
hand, would provide the only
62
remedy for a decedent's family.
The Dralle court also posited a fundamental difference between
marital and filial relationships which justified recovery for impairment
of the former but not the latter.63 The court maintained that spousal
consortium "'includes, in addition to material services, elements of
53. 529 N.E.2d 209 (Ill.
1988).
54. Id. at 212.
55. Dralle v. Ruder, 500 N.E.2d 514, 515 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1986).
56. Dralle, 529 N.E.2d at 210. The complaint alleged that the child's injuries were
caused by anoxia (lack of oxygen) at birth and his mother's use of the prescription drug
Bendectin during pregnancy. Id. The Dralle court considered only the consortium claim
arising from the mother's use of Bendectin. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 211 (citing Bullard v. Barnes, 468 N.E.2d 1228, 1233 (Ill. 1984)). Loss of
consortium damages generally may be recovered under wrongful death statutes. 2 DOBBS,
supra note 1,§ 8.1(5), at 400' n.l. The Illinois Wrongful Death Act, for example,
permits children to recover for "pecuniary injuries" resulting from a parent's wrongful
death. ILL. COMP. STAT. ch. 740, § 180/1 (West 1993). Illinois courts hold that pecuniary injuries under the Wrongful Death Act include loss of consortium. Bullard v.
Barnes, 468 N.E.2d 1228, 1233-34 (Ill.
1984) (creating a rebuttable presumption of lost
filial consortium in wrongful death); Elliott v. Willis, 442 N.E.2d 163, 170 (I11.
1982)
(creating a rebuttable presumption of lost spousal consortium in wrongful death).
59. Dralle, 529 N.E.2d at 212.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 214.
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companionship, felicity and sexual intercourse, all welded into a
conceptualistic unity. "64 It therefore concluded that the marital relationship was sufficiently different from the filial relationship to justify
denying consortium damages to the latter. 65
The court also advanced policy reasons for declining to extend
parents' consortium claims to cases of nonfatal injury.6 6 First, the
court urged that recognizing claims for loss of society because of
nonfatal injury would inappropriately enlarge tort liability by laying the
groundwork for a broad range of persons, such as grandparents,
siblings, and friends, to bring similar claims.67 Second, the court
anticipated difficulties in assessing damages.68 It stated that'a trier of
fact could not accurately quantify the diminution in the quality of a
parent-child relationship. 69 Additionally, permitting both the injured
child and the parents to bring separate claims invited duplicate
recoveries. 70 The court reasoned that a jury would encounter great
difficulty in distinguishing the child's claim for pain and suffering
from the parents' claim for loss of consortium; 71 consequently, the
jury might erroneously award damages for both.72
Although in Dralle the supreme court addressed only the parents'
claim, it likely would apply the same reasoning to deny the children's
claim for loss of parental consortium because of nonfatal injury.7 3
64. Dralle, 529 N.E.2d at 214 (quoting Dini, 170 N.E.2d at 891).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 213-14.
67. Id. at 213. "'Every injury has ramifying consequences, like the ripplings of the
waters, without end. The problem for the law is to limit the legal consequences of
wrongs to a controllable degree."' Id. (quoting Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 447 N.E.2d
385, 390 (I11.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 846 (1983)). Seventy-five years earlier, the
Illinois Appellate Court had voiced a similar objection to permitting a wife a consortium
claim for injury to her husband:
If the wife can recover, why not each of the minor children dependent on [the
injured] for support and education? If the minor children, why not those
family relations whose support, in case of their indigence, is placed on him by
law? Or why not each of his creditors, who suffers a pecuniary loss in his
inability to pay? Or even the societies or charitable associations to which he
is no longer able to contribute? Where would the right of action for a single
injury end?
Patelski v. Snyder, 179 II1. App. 24, 27 (1913).
68. Dralle, 529 N.E.2d at 213.
69. Id. The court suggested that in some cases such an injury could strengthen a
family by creating a greater appreciation of life. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Dralle, 529 N.E.2d at 213.
73. In Van De Veire v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 533 N.E.2d 994 (I11.
App. Ct. 1989),
the appellate court cited Dralle in support of its decision to deny a minor child recovery
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Indeed, the Drallecourt twice cited Koskela with approval.74
IV.

ANALYSIS

This part analyzes the approach taken in states that, unlike Illinois,
permit children to recover loss of consortium damages for nonfatal
injury to their parents." Generally, courts that recognize the
children's claim reject any distinctions between marital or filial relationships and between fatal or nonfatal injury.7 6 These courts also
77
reject policy arguments offered in opposition to the children's claim.
This part also evaluates Illinois' approach to filial consortium, as set
forth in Dralle and Koskela, in light of the approach taken in the states
that recognize the children's claim 78 and in light of earlier Illinois
decisions.79
A. The Approach in Other States
In Ferriterv. Daniel O'Connell'sSons, Inc.,8° the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts became the first state court of last resort to
recognize a child's right to recover damages for loss of parental
consortium because of nonfatal injury.8 In Ferriter,the father of two
minor children suffered a permanently disabling injury as a result of an
accident at a construction site. 82 The trial court recognized the

for loss of parental consortium because of nonfatal injury. Id. at 995-96. See also
Hutson v. Bell, 702 F. Supp. 212 (N.D. III. 1988).
74. Dralle, 529 N.E.2d at 210-11, 213. Dralle might not be followed in suits under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). In Hutson v. Bell, 702 F. Supp. 212 (N.D. Ill. 1988), the
district court declined to follow Dralle because it found that the parent-child relationship
was a protected liberty interest under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Id.at 214. The court therefore held that impairment of that interest
through nonfatal injury to a child could support a § 1983 action despite Dralle. Id.
75. See infra part IV.A.
76. See infra note 92 and accompanying text.
77. See infra note 93 and accompanying text.
78. See infra parts IV.B.I-3.
79. See infra part IV.B.4.
80. 413 N.E.2d 690 (Mass. 1980).
81. Id. at 696. Although the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court was the first state
supreme court to validate the children's claim, the Michigan Court of Appeals became
the first court of review in the nation to do so. See Berger v. Weber, 267 N.W.2d 124,
126 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978). The Supreme Court of Michigan affirmed the Michigan
Court of Appeals' decision in Berger after the Massachusetts court's decision in Ferriter.
See Berger v. Weber, 303 N.W.2d 424, 427 (Mich. 1981).
82. 413 N.E.2d at 691. The father in Ferriterworked as a carpenter for the defendant.
A one to two-hundred-pound load of wooden beams fell approximately fifty feet and
struck him on the neck, paralyzing him below that point. Id.
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children's claim for the loss of their father's consortium. 83 On direct
review, the supreme judicial court affirmed the children's right to
recover consortium damages conditioned on proof of their minority
and dependency upon their father. 84
The Ferritercourt rejected the argument that the childrens' interest in
the relationship with their parents was somehow less intense than the
parents' interest in each other.85 The court discerned no appreciable
difference between the marital and filial relationship and therefore
found no reason to deny the children's claim.86
Moreover, the court found no reason to distinguish between fatal
and nonfatal injury.8 7 In view of a Massachusetts statute granting
children the right to recover for loss of parental consortium because of
wrongful death, the court found it appropriate to protect childrens'
reasonable expectation of parental consortium when the parent suffered
negligent injury rather than death.89
In addition to rejecting arguments based on alleged differences
between marital and filial consortium and fatal and nonfatal injury, the
Ferritercourt also rejected arguments recognizing that the children's
claim would cause an unreasonable expansion of tort liability, a
multiplicity of lawsuits, difficulty in assessing damages, and would
constitute an unwarranted failure to defer to the legislature.'
Since Ferriter,twelve additional state supreme courts have recognized the children's claim. 9' Like the Ferritercourt, these courts have
83. Id.
84. Id. at 696. The court noted here that dependency includes not only economic
dependency, but also dependence upon the father for the "filial needs [of] closeness,
guidance, and nurture." Id. Some courts recognizing the children's claim do not require
that the child be a minor or economically dependent on the parent. See, e.g., Ueland v.
Reynolds Metals Co., 691 P.2d 190, 195 (Wash. 1984).
Although they agreed that children should recover damages for loss of parental consortium because of nonfatal injury, three justices each wrote a separate dissenting opinion
in Ferriterbecause they doubted that loss of consortium damages should be recoverable
in actions under the Massachusetts Workmen's Compensation Act. Ferriter,413 N.E.2d
at 703-11 (Quirico, Hennessey, Wilkins, JJ., dissenting).
85. Id. at 692.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 695.
88. Id. (citing MASS. GEN. L. ch. 229, § 2 (1973)).
89. Ferriter,413 N.E.2d at 695. The court noted that a principal reason for denying
recovery of lost parental consortium in an earlier alienation of affections case, Nelson
v. Richwagen, 95 N.E.2d 545 (Mass. 1950), was that children enjoyed no legal right to
their parents' society. Ferriter,413 N.E.2d at 695.
90. Id. at 694-96 (citing Diaz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 302 N.E.2d 555 (Mass. 1973);
Nelson, 95 N.E.2d at 545).
91. Hibpshman v. Prudhoe Bay Supply, Inc., 734 P.2d 991, 997 (Alaska 1987);
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rejected distinctions between marital and filial relationships and
between fatal and nonfatal injury.9 2 These courts have focused on

whether they should deny the children's claim because of the four
policy arguments rejected in Ferriter.93 The four common objections
to the children's claim are examined below.
1. Undue Burden on Defendants
Some courts have denied the children's claim because of their
unwillingness to expand tort liability.94 According to this view,
Villareal v. Arizona, 774 P.2d 213, 216 (Ariz. 1989); Berger v. Weber, 303 N.W.2d
424, 427 (Mich. 1981); Pence v. Fox, 813 P.2d 429, 433 (Mont. 1991); Gallimore v.
Children's Hosp. Medical Ctr., 617 N.E.2d 1052, 1060 (Ohio 1993); Williams v. Hook,
804 P.2d 1131, 1138 (Okla. 1990); Reagan v. Vaughn, 804 S.W.2d 463, 465-66 (Tex.
1990); Hay v. Medical Ctr. Hosp., 496 A.2d 939, 946 (Vt. 1985); Ueland v. Reynolds
Metals Co., 691 P.2d 190, 195 (Wash. 1984); Belcher v. Goins, 400 S.E.2d 830, 841
(W. Va. 1990); Theama v. City of Kenosha, 344 N.W.2d 513, 522 (Wis. 1984); Craft v.
Hermes Consol., Inc., 797 P.2d 559, 560 (Wyo. 1990); see also Higley v. Kramer, 581
So. 2d 273, 283 (La. Ct. App.), appeal denied, 583 So. 2d 483 (La. 1991).
92. Indeed, even courts that deny children recovery for loss of parental consortium
because of nonfatal injury often recognize the justice of the children's claim. See, e.g.,
Hill v. Sibley Memorial Hosp., 108 F. Supp. 739, 741 (D.D.C. 1952); Hankins v.
Derby, 211 N.W.2d 581, 582 (Iowa 1973); Hoffman v. Dautel, 368 P.2d 57, 59 (Kan.
1962). For example, the Kansas Supreme Court stated in Hoffman that:
It is common knowledge that a parent who suffers serious physical or mental
injury is unable to give his minor children the parental care, training, love and
companionship in the same degree as he might have but for the injury. Hence,
it is difficult for the court, on the basis of natural justice, to reach the conclusion that this type of action will not lie. Human tendencies and sympathies
suggest otherwise. Normal home life for a child consists of complex incidences in which the sums constitute a nurturing environment. When the
vitally important parent-child relationship is impaired and the child loses the
love, guidance and close companionship of a parent, the child is deprived of
something that is indeed valuable and precious. No one could seriously
contend otherwise.
Hoffman, 368 P.2d at 59.
93. See supra text accompanying note 90. Virtually all courts recognizing the
children's claim address these four issues. See, e.g., Belcher, 400 S.E.2d at 837. Courts
often also reject arguments opposing the children's claim based on the weight of precedent, possible adverse effect on the family, and possible increased liability insurance
premiums. See, e.g., id.
94. In Russell v. Salem Transp. Co., 295 A.2d 862 (N.J. 1972) the New Jersey
Supreme Court stated:
If the [children's consortium] claim were allowed there would be a
substantial accretion of liability against the tortfeasor arising out of a single
transaction (typically the negligent operation of an automobile). Whereas the
assertion of a spouse's demand for loss of consortium involves the joining of
only a single companion claim in the action with that of the injured person,
the right here debated would entail adding as many companion claims as the
injured parent had minor children, each such claim entitled to separate
appraisal and award. The defendant's burden would be further enlarged if the
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permitting the injured parent's children to recover would expand liability by giving rise to claims by new classes of plaintiffs, including
grandparents and even neighbors who somehow benefited from the
injured parent's companionship. 95 As the Illinois Appellate Court
lamented in Patelski v. Snyder,96 "[w]here would the right of action
for a single injury end?"9 7 Proponents of this view maintain that
courts open a Pandora's Box by permitting the children's claim
because other persons having a more remote relationship to the injured
would undoubtedly seek to recover consortium damages. 98 In
essence, then, this argument against the children's claim charges that
courts create a slippery slope by recognizing the claim.
The slippery slope argument, however, is a fallacy.9 9 Slippery
slope arguments simply ignore the complexity of long chains of
events.'I° To be convincing, one who predicts that an action necessarily leads to an undesirable result should demonstrate precisely how
such a result would occur. Otherwise, the proponent commits the
slippery slope fallacy.'0 '
Courts that accept the argument that permitting the children's claim
will unduly broaden consortium recovery commit the slippery slope
fallacy. Those courts accept, without evidence, that permitting the
children's claim will extend recovery to those with an attenuated relationship to the injured person. They fail, however, to consider
factors, such as courts' control over the development of the common

claims were founded upon injuries to both parents. Magnification of damage
awards to a single family derived from a single accident might well become a
serious problem to a particular defendant as well as in terms of the total cost of
such enhanced awards to the insured community as a whole.
Id. at 864; see also Borer v. American Airlines, 563 P.2d 858, 863 (Cal. 1977); Belcher,
400 S.E.2d at 835.
95. Dwork, supra note 27, at 736-37.
96. 179 Ill.
App. 24 (1913).
97. Id. at 27; see also supra note 67.
98. See, e.g., Borer, 563 P.2d at 862; Dralle v. Ruder, 529 N.E.2d 209, 213 (Ill.
1988). For a discussion of this aspect of Dralle, see supra note 67 and accompanying
text.
99. ANNETTE T. ROTTENBERG, ELEMENTS OF ARGUMENT: A TEXT AND READER 185
(1985).
100. Id.
101. Id. Rottenberg provides an example: in 1941, some predicted that conscription
would lead to fascism in the United States. Id. After World War II ended and the United
States demobilized, it became clear that conscription inadequately predicted fascism. Id.
Rottenberg notes that this incorrect prediction could have been avoided if other influences indicating the strength of democracy in this country were given sufficient weight.
ROTTENBERG, supra note 99, at 185.
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law,' 0 2 that could limit unreasonable expansion of the consortium
claim. Absent any solid evidence that permitting the children's claim
will necessarily broaden the class of persons who may recover loss of
consortium damages, the slippery slope argument remains unpersuasive.'O0
Undoubtedly, severe injury affects others beyond the injured
person's nuclear family. Relatives, friends, acquaintances, and
coworkers often suffer some loss from another's severe injury or
death.' n Thus, a line limiting liability to certain relationships must be
drawn. It is the role of courts to draw this somewhat arbitrary line,
and with
respect to the children's claim, most have drawn it incor05
rectly.1
Moreover, allowing the children's claim will not substantially
expand defendants' liability. Defendants are already held liable for
loss of spousal consortium because of fatal or nonfatal injury. 10 6 In
wrongful death cases, defendants are frequently held liable for lost
parental consortium.'0 7 Thus, making defendants liable for loss of
parental consortium because of nonfatal injury will not significantly
increase tort liability, because defendants are already liable for loss of
consortium in other types of actions.0 8
Still other courts deny the children's claim because permitting each
102. As the Ferritercourt recognized, "[a]s claims for injuries to other relationships
come before us, we shall judge them according to their nature and their force." Ferriter,
413 N.E.2d at 696.
103. Those who credit the slippery slope argument against expansion of consortium
damages should note that although from the founding of the United States, husbands
could recover for loss of spousal consortium because of nonfatal injury, wives could not
so recover until 1950. See supra notes 25-32 and accompanying text.
104. "Every injury has ramifying consequences, like the ripplings of the waters,
without end." Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 447 N.E.2d 385, 390 (II1.) (quoting Tobin v.
Grossman, 249 N.E.2d 419, 424 (N.Y. 1969)), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 846 (1983); see
also supra note 67.
105. "In delineating the extent of a tortfeasor's responsibility for damages under the
general rule of tort liability, the courts must locate the line between liability and nonliability at some point, a decision which is essentially political." Suter v. Leonard, 120
Cal. Rptr. 110, 112 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975). Thus, the decision whether to protect a given
relationship by granting consortium recovery for its impairment resembles the question
of how to determine proximate cause. See Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99,
103-04 (N.Y. 1928) (Andrews, J., dissenting). Although a tortfeasor's injury to another
will be the cause in fact of emotional injury to a great many third persons, the law, by
limiting the availability of loss of consortium damages, limits the tortfeasor's liability.
See id.
106. See supra part II.A.; see also supra note 58.
107. Dwork, supra note 27, at 737. Illinois courts also permit children to recover for
lost parental consortium in wrongful death. See infra note 191 and accompanying text.
108. Dwork, supra note 27, at 737.
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of an injured parent's children to recover also might overwhelm tortfeasors with increased liability.'0 9 Those courts distinguish the claim
for spousal consortium, where, at most, one person may recover. For
instance, the California Supreme Court determined in Borer v.
American Airlines" that recognizing a right of action for each child
would unreasonably expand liability.'' Yet the Borer court reasoned
from a faulty premise: that Americans typically have many children.
As noted by the dissent in Borer, few accident victims will have the
large number of children that the injured parent in Borer had." 2 To the
contrary, at that time the majority of American households had far
fewer minor children." 3 As of 1974, over 65% of families in the
United States had one or zero minor children and only 7% had more
than four minor children." 14
The argument advanced by the Borer dissent is even stronger today.
As of 1990, 51% of American families had no children and 71% had
one or zero children.'" Only 3% of families had more than four
children. 1 6 Thus, because of the low number of children found in
typical American families, recognizing the children's claim will not
significantly expand liability.
As the dissenting opinion in Borer further noted, permitting the
children's consortium claim will probably expand tort liability less than
when courts extended the consortium claim to wives." 7 First, not all
married couples will have children." 8 Second, those couples that do
have children will likely be parents of minor children for a shorter time
than they will be spouses. " 9 Consequently, recognizing a children's
claim for loss of parental consortium because of nonfatal injury will
have a lesser effect on overall liability than when courts extended the
analogous claim to wives.' 20
109. See, e.g., Juene v. Del E. Webb Constr. Co., 269 P.2d 723, 724 (Ariz. 1954);
Borer, 563 P.2d at 864; Hoffman v. Dautel, 368 P.2d 57, 59-60 (Kan. 1962); Russell v.
Salem Transp. Co., 295 A.2d 862, 864 (N.J. 1972).
110. 563 P.2d 858 (Cal. 1977).
111. Id. at 863-64.
112. Id. at 868-69 (Mosk, J., dissenting). The injured parent in Borer had nine
children. Id. at 860.
113. Id. at 868-69 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
114. Borer, 563 P.2d at 868-69 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
115.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED

STATES 52 (112th ed. 1992).

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id.
Borer, 563
Id. (Mosk,
Id. (Mosk,
Id. (Mosk,

P.2d at 869 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
J., dissenting).
J., dissenting).
J., dissenting).
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2. Increased Litigation
Many courts deny the children's claim because they fear that litiga2
tion will increase if children enjoy an independent right of action.' 1
These courts maintain that permitting each child to recover for lost
parental consortium will unduly increase the number of lawsuits."
Nonetheless, courts that permit the children's claim recognize that
they can limit the number of actions by requiring that all dependent
children join in the injured parent's suit. 23 If children should enjoy a
right to recover for lost parental consortium, justice requires that courts
24
not deny recovery simply because there may be multiple claims.
3. Difficulty in Assessing Damages Accurately
a. IntangibleNature of the Loss
Some courts deny the children's claim because juries find it difficult25
to calculate accurately the value of the parent-child relationship.
Granted, juries will encounter difficulty in precisely determining loss
of consortium damages. Nonetheless, juries regularly award money
damages for intangible injuries such as physical pain, mental anguish,26
impairment, and disfigurement resulting from personal injuries.
Because our tort system requires that injuries be compensated despite
difficulty in calculating damages, 27 courts should not deny the
121. Delaney, supra note 26, at 107-08.
122. See, e.g., Borer, 563 P.2d at 863; Hoffman, 368 P.2d at 60.
123. See, e.g., Hibpshman, 734 P.2d at 997 (stating that "a practical and fair solution to the problem is to require joinder of the minors' consortium claim with the injured
parent's claim whenever feasible"). Illinois permits joinder of claims arising from a
single transaction. ILL. COMP. STAT. ch. 735, § 5/2-404 (West 1993); see also FED. R.
Civ. P. 20(a).
124. "[lt is no objection to say, that it will occasion multiplicity of actions; for if
men will multiply injuries, actions must be multiplied too; for every man that is injured
ought to have his recompense." Ashby v. White, 92 Eng. Rep. 126, 137 (K.B. 1703)
(Holt, C.J., dissenting); see also Delaney, supra note 26, at 131-32.
125. Delaney, supra note 26, at 107-08; see also Salin v. Kloempken, 322 N.W.2d
736, 740 (Minn. 1982) (stating that the intangible nature of the child's loss counsels
against recognizing his right of action); Reagan v. Vaughn, 804 S.W.2d 463, 483-84
(Tex. 1990) (Hecht, J., concurring and dissenting) (stating that assessing damages for
loss of consortium is more difficult than for other sorts of intangible losses).
126. See Dwork, supra note 27, at 734.
127. One commentator stated that:
Where the tort itself is of such a nature as to preclude the ascertainment of the
amount of damages with certainty, it would be a perversion of fundamental
principles of justice to deny all relief to the injured person, and thereby relieve
the wrongdoer from making any amend for his acts.
CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 27, at 102 (1935)

(quoting Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 563
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children's claim merely because damages may be difficult to calculate.
Additionally, because juries place a value on the marital relationship
in calculating damages for lost spousal consortium 28 and value the
filial relationship in wrongful death actions, 129 no reason exists to deny
the children's claim because it is difficult to value. 30 Difficulty in
assessing damages therefore is an insufficient basis for denying the
children's claim.
b. Dangerof Double Recovery
Courts have also opposed the children's claim because of a
perceived danger of double recovery.' 3 1 These courts reason that
double recovery is possible because, for example, a jury might award
a child damages for lost financial support and also award the injured
parent damages for lost earnings. 3' Alternatively, a jury might
include damages for the child's emotional loss in both the parent's
award and the child's award. 33 Just as courts can avoid the perceived
problem of increased litigation through means less drastic than denying
the children's claim altogether, less drastic means exist for avoiding
the problem of double recovery.
For example, courts can use jury instructions designed to avoid
double recovery. 34 Precise instructions would make clear to the jury
that the parent's and the child's claims are distinct. Carefully drafted
jury instructions could ensure that children recover damages only for
their lost parental consortium, and parents will recover damages only

(1931)).
128. See supra notes 25-32 and accompanying text.
129. See infra notes 185-91 and accompanying text.
130. Hibpshman, 734 P.2d at 996 ("We see no reason to consider the calculation of
damages for a child's loss of parental consortium any more speculative or difficult than
that necessary in other consortium, wrongful death, emotional distress, or pain and
suffering actions." (footnote omitted)); see also Berger v. Weber, 303 N.W.2d 424, 427
(Mich. 1981); Hay v. Medical Ctr. Hosp., 496 A.2d 939, 943-44 (Vt. 1985); Theama v.
City of Kenosha, 344 N.W.2d 513, 519-20 (Wis. 1984). But see Reagan v. Vaughn,
804 S.W.2d at 483 (Hecht, J., concurring and dissenting) (doubting that juries would
find the factors the majority set forth helpful in determining loss of consortium
damages).
13 1. By double recovery, courts refer to the possible overlap between the child's and
the parent's damages. See, e.g., Salin v. Kloempken, 322 N.W.2d 736, 740 (Minn.
1982); High v. Howard, 592 N.E.2d 818, 820 (Ohio 1992), overruled by Gallimore, 617
N.E.2d at 1052; Borer, 563 P.2d at 863.
132. See, e.g., Koskela v. Martin, 414 N.E.2d 1148, 1151 (I11.App. Ct. 1980).
133. See, e.g., Borer, 563 P.2d at 863.
134. See, e.g., Hay, 496 A.2d at 944 (discussing the trial court's ability to give
instructions allowing juries to properly compute and allocate damages).
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for their own injuries. 131
4. Legislative Deference
Although courts generally recognize the appeal of the children's
claim, 136 many refuse to recognize it, reasoning that legislatures, rather
than courts, should create new rights of action. 37 Illinois courts rely
principally on such reasoning in refusing to recognize the children's
claim. 1 38 This reluctance to act is surprising given that
courts, not
39
legislatures, created and expanded the consortium claim.
Since 1980, however, courts that recognize the children's claim
have rejected this argument. 4 ° Indeed, courts have traditionally
created new rights and remedies in response to changes in society that
legislatures have not yet addressed. 4' American courts, therefore,
135. Delaney suggests the following as a model jury instruction:
To answer the question pertaining to loss of parental consortium with the
parent, you should name such sum as you feel will fairly and reasonably
compensate the children for such loss as they have sustained by being
deprived of the parent's aid, assistance, comfort, society, and companionship
during such period as the parent was unable to render such services because of
the injuries. In considering the amount to be awarded, you will bear in mind
the evidence as to the relationship which existed between the parent and the
child before the injury.
You will not include in your finding any sum which you are required to
determine in any other question, representing loss of earning capacity
sustained by the parent by reason of his injuries. To do so would allow double
damages for such loss of earning capacity, which you must not do.
Delaney, supra note 26, at 131 n.173.
136. See supra note 92.
137. See, e.g., DeAngelis v. Lutheran Medical Ctr., 449 N.E.2d 406, 408 (N.Y.
1983); Norwest v. Presbyterian Intercommunity Hosp., 652 P.2d 318, 323 (Or. 1982).
However, at least one state legislature has provided for the children's claim. After the
Florida Supreme Court rejected the children's claim in Zorzos v. Rosen, 467 So. 2d 305
(Fla. 1985), the Florida Legislature enacted legislation providing in part: "A person
who, through negligence, causes significant permanent injury to the natural or adoptive
parent of an unmarried dependent resulting in a permanent total disability shall be liable
to the dependent for damages, including damages for permanent loss of services,
comfort, companionship, and society." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.0415 (West Supp.
1994).
138. See supra part Ill.
139. See supra part II.
140. See, e.g., Hibpshman, 734 P.2d at 995 (recognizing the court's responsibility
to adapt the common law to address changed societal views where the legislature fails to
act), modified, Truesdell v. Halliburton Co., 754 P.2d 236 (Alaska 1988); see also
Ueland v. Reynolds Metals Co., 691 P.2d 190, 193 (Wash. 1984) (stating that when
justice requires courts to recognize a new right of action they abdicate their responsibility by deferring to the legislature).
14 1. See Hay, 496 A.2d at 945 (stating that "[tihe main characteristic of the common
law is its dynamism").
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should 42not await legislative action before recognizing the children's
1
claim.
B. Problems With the Illinois Approach
The reasons set forth in Dralle and Koskela for denying protection
to the filial relationship are unpersuasive. Two distinctions upon
which the court in Dralle relied-those between marital and filial relationships and between fatal and nonfatal injury143-are distinctions
without a difference and therefore provide no basis for denying the
children's claim.
1. Filial and Marital Consortium Are Similar
Illinois courts perpetuate an insupportable inconsistency by permitting adults to recover loss of consortium damages for nonfatal injury to
a spouse while denying children recovery for nonfatal injury to a
parent. In Dralle, the Illinois Supreme Court posited a fundamental
difference between marital and filial relationships that justified legal
protection of one but not the other.' 44 Yet, this unequal treatment of
marital and filial consortium is unjustified because those relationships
142. Justice Cardozo recognized courts' responsibility to reform the common law in
response to change:
That court best serves the law which recognizes that the rules of law which
grew up in a remote generation may, in the fullness of experience, be found to
serve another generation badly, and which discards the old rule when it finds
that another rule of law represents what should be according to the established
and settled judgment of society, and no considerable property rights have
become vested in reliance upon the old rule. It is thus great writers upon the
common law have discovered the source and method of its growth, and in its
growth found its health and life. It is not and should not be stationary.
Change of this character should not be left to the legislature.
BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 151-52 (1921) (quoting Dwy
v. Connecticut Co., 92 A. 883, 891 (Conn. 1915) (Wheeler, J., concurring)).
In expanding the consortium claim, Justice Liacos in Ferriter recognized the same
responsibility:
"In a field long left to the common law, change may well come about by the
same medium of development. Sensible reform can here be achieved without
the articulation of detail or the creation of administrative mechanisms that
customarily comes about by legislative enactment . . . . In the end the
Legislature may say that we have mistaken the present public understanding of
the nature of the [parent-child] relation, but that we cannot now divine or
anticipate."
413 N.E.2d at 695-96, superseded by MASS. GEN. L. ch. 152, § 24 (1989) (quoting Diaz
v. Eli Lilly & Co., 302 N.E.2d 555, 563 (Mass. 1973)) (alterations in original).
143. See supra text accompanying notes 60-65.
144. 529 N.E.2d at 214. "[T]here is no inconsistency . . . in denying recovery for
loss of filial . . . society and companionship and in allowing recovery for loss of
spousal consortium." Id.
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are not sufficiently different to warrant unequal protection.
In his concurring opinion in Dralle, Justice Clark recognized that
any differences between the marital and filial relationships cannot
justify unequal protection. 45 The Dralle majority reasoned that the
filial relationship merits less protection because it lacks many of the
marital relationship's attributes, such as "companionship, felicity and
sexual intercourse."' 146 Yet, as Justice Clark pointed out, the modem
parent-child relationship
surely includes felicity and companionship as
147
key ingredients.
Justice Clark stressed that the majority predicated its distinction
between the relationships on the issue of sexual intercourse alone. 48
He correctly concluded that this difference cannot justify distinguishing between marital and filial relationships.' 49 Sexual relations are
only one aspect of consortium. 5 ° Marriage is a basic right,
145. Dralle, 529 N.E.2d at 216 (Clark, J., concurring). "A difference which makes no
difference is no difference." Id. (Clark, J., concurring). Although Justice Clark rejected
the majority's denial of consortium damages for impairment of the filial relationship
because of nonfatal injury, he concluded that Woodill v. Parke Davis & Co., 402 N.E.2d
194 (I11. 1980), which bars recovery for emotional distress in strict products liability
actions, would bar recovery in Dralle. Dralle, 529 N.E.2d at 215 (Clark, J., concurring).
Loss of consortium is "principally a form of mental suffering." Rodriguez v. Bethlehem
Steel Corp., 525 P.2d 669, 681 (Cal. 1974).
146. Dralle, 529 N.E.2d at 214 (quoting Dini v. Naiditch, 170 N.E.2d 881, 891 (I11.
1960)).
147. Id. at 217 (Clark, J., concurring); see also Bullard v. Barnes, 468 N.E.2d 1228,
1234 (Ill. 1984) ("[T]he chief value of children to their parents is the intangible benefits
they provide in the form of comfort, counsel and society."). The current nature of the
filial relationship differs from its nature in the past, when parents valued children
largely for their service. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. Today, child protection laws, such as those governing child labor and compulsory education, prevent
children from functioning as economic assets to their parents. Instead, parents value
children today for their society and companionship. Thus, the significance of the
parents' action for loss of consortium today is that it compensates them for emotional,
rather than economic, loss because of injury to their child. Dwork, supra note 27, at
731-32.
148. See Dralle, 529 N.E.2d at 217 (Clark, J., concurring). Justice Clark acknowledged that the majority opinion never expressly stated this: "[R]eticence apparently
prevents [the majority] from making the distinction explicit ....... Id. (Clark, J.,
concurring).
149. Id. (Clark, J., concurring) ("[T]he term 'consortium,' contrary to the belief of
many lawyers, never has been limited to sexual intercourse. Compensation for loss of
consortium must be made even in circumstances where, for physical or other reasons,
intercourse is not even a factor .... ) See also JEROME MIRZA, ILLINOIS TORT LAW AND
PRACTICE § 17:5, at 479-80 (2d ed. 1988).
150. Dralle, 529 N.E.2d at 214 (describing spousal consortium as including sexual
intercourse, but also elements of companionship and felicity). Other courts agree. See,
e.g., Berger v. Weber, 303 N.W.2d 424, 426 (Mich. 1981) ("We are not persuaded that
[the distinction between spousal and filial consortium] is significant enough to deny the
child's claim. Sexual relations are but one element of the spouse's consortium action.
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"fundamental to our very existence and survival,"'' but "[a]n injury to
an interest in the companionship of a child is no less wounding than an
injury to an interest in the companionship of a spouse."' 52 Although
Justice Clark considered the value of the filial relationship in the
context of parents' claims for nonfatal injuries to a child, his view
remains persuasive when considered in the converse situation of a
child's claim for nonfatal injuries to a parent.'53
In fact, allowing loss of consortium damages for the filial
relationship may be more appropriate than for the marital relationship
because children may rely on parents even more than spouses rely on
each other.'54 Unfortunately, money damages cannot repair damage to
a child's relationship with his or her parent, 5 5 but our legal system can
offer no better remedy. 56 Simply because children cannot be
completely compensated for
their loss cannot justify ignoring the
57
children's claim altogether.1
2. Nonfatal Injury Can Diminish Consortium as Much as Death
Illinois courts perpetuate another insupportable inconsistency by
permitting children to recover for lost parental consortium in wrongful
The other elements ...are similar in both relationships and in each are deserving of
protection."); Borer v. American Airlines, 563 P.2d 858, 868 (Cal. 1977) (Mosk, J.,
dissenting) (doubting "that sexual activity is more worthy of the law's concern than the
affection, comfort, and guidance which loving parents bestow on their children"); see
also Jean C. Love, Tortious Interference with the Parent-ChildRelationship: Loss of an
Injured Person's Society and Companionship,51 IND. L.J. 590, 614-15 (1976) (stating
that although marital consortium includes sexual relations, sex is irrelevant to whether
children should recover for loss of parental consortium because of nonfatal injury).
Justice Clark, however, declined to completely equate the marital and filial
relationships. "While [the relationships] share much in common, they differ in the
texture of their emotional fabric." Dralle, 529 N.E.2d at 217 (Clark, J.,
concurring).
151. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
152. Dralle, 529 N.E.2d at 217 (Clark, J.,
concurring). As noted above, by the late
nineteenth century, emotional loss became the dominant theme of the consortium claim.
See supra text accompanying note 29.
153. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
154. See Dwork, supra note 27, at 742 (arguing that children deserve greater damages
than spouses because their emotional underdevelopment requires that they receive more
nurturing to develop properly).
155. Theama v. City of Kenosha, 344 N.W.2d 513, 520 (Wis. 1984) (rejecting the
argument that the inadequacy of money damages justifies denying the children's claim).
156. See Kent H. Bigler, Note, Washington Expands A Child's Cause Of Action For
Loss Of Parental Consortium. Ueland v. Reynolds Metals Co., 103 Wn. 2d 131, 691
P.2d 190 (1984), 20 GONz. L. REV. 601, 605 (1984-85) (acknowledging the inadequacy
of damages but stating that some writers believe they may help).
157. Berger v. Weber, 267 N.W.2d 124, 128-29 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978) (noting that
money damages cannot truly compensate for other intangible losses such as pain, suffering, or death).
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death actions but not for nonfatal injury.' 58 A disabling injury can

deprive a child of parental consortium just as surely as death. 59 As
the Arizona Supreme Court put it, "[o]ften death is separated from
severe injury by mere fortuity; and it would be anomalous to distinguish between the two when the quality of consortium is negatively
affected by both."'' 60 Consequently, it is misguided to distinguish
between injuries that are fatal and those that are severe, yet nonfatal, in
allowing loss of consortium damages.
Imagine a parent left in a persistent vegetative state as a result of a
defendant's negligence. Although that parent's children are deprived
of consortium just as much as if the defendant had killed that parent,
Illinois courts would deny the children any recovery for the value of
the parent-child relationship. Indeed, commentators have urged that
living with a severely injured person6 may affect family members more
than if that person had been killed.' '
In distinguishing between fatal and nonfatal injuries, the Dralle court
failed to recognize the significance of the consortium claim altogether.
By denying a parent loss of consortium damages, the court in effect
ruled that since the child survived, he should bring his own action to
recover damages. 62 The court discerned no reason to permit the
parents to recover because the child's action provided the family with

158. In considering Dralle one commentator stated "[tlhere is no reasonable basis to
rationalize the current Illinois Supreme Court's decision in Dralle denying a parental
claim for loss of companionship with the court's previous rulings authorizing such a
recovery in wrongful death cases." 4 ILLINOIS PERSONAL INJURY § 403:20, at I 1l (George
L. Bounds et al. eds. 1989) (Mirza Practice Commentary).
159. Justice Clark suggested that the distinction between fatal and nonfatal injury is
perhaps more unjustified than that between spousal and filial consortium. Dralle, 529
N.E.2d at 217 (Clark, J.,
concurring). He stated that "[t]he distinction between fatal and
nonfatal injury is not rational." Id. at 218 (Clark, J., concurring); see also Ferriter,413
N.E.2d at 695, superseded by MASS. GEN. L. ch. 152, § 24 (1989); Berger v. Weber, 303
N.W.2d 424, 426 (Mich 1981).
160. Frank v. Superior Court, 722 P.2d 955, 957 (Ariz. 1986).
161. See, e.g., Shirley S. Simpson, Comment, The Parental Claim for Loss of
Society and Companionship Resulting From the Negligent Injury of a Child: A Proposal
for Arizona, 1980 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 909, 923 (1980). The Arizona Supreme Court in Frank
stated that:
Perhaps the loss of companionship and society experienced by the parents of
a child permanently and severely injured ... is in some ways even greater than
that suffered by the parents of a deceased child. Not only has the normal
family relationship been destroyed, as when a child dies, but the parent is also
confronted with his loss each time he is with his child and experiences again
the child's diminished capacity to give comfort, society, and companionship.
722 P.2d at 958 (quoting Simpson, supra, at 923).
162. See Dralle, 529 N.E.2d at 212; see also supra text accompanying notes 60-62.
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an adequate remedy against the tortfeasor.163
However, impairment of a relationship by fatal or nonfatal injury
amounts to a separate and independent harm to the injured person's
family. The parents in Dralle, therefore, should have enjoyed a right
of action for loss of consortium regardless of whether their son
survived to enforce his rights against the tortfeasor.' 64 By the same
logic, children must enjoy a right of action against those who impair
the filial relationship by severely injuring their parents.' 65
3. Policy Arguments Against the Children's Claim Fail
Cases from the thirteen states that recognize the children's claim
illustrate the flaws in the policy arguments set forth in Dralle and
Koskela. 66 First, slippery slope arguments are often fallacious, 67
and in Dralle, the supreme court succumbed to just such an argument. 68 The court offered no support for its conclusion that permitting parents to recover loss of consortium damages for nonfatal injury
to their children would inevitably result in consortium recovery by
those with a more distant relationship to the child. 169 Moreover, the
Dralle court completely discounted its ability-to expand consortium
recovery to 7the
proper extent while avoiding harmful or unwarranted
0
expansion.
163. Dralle, 529 N.E.2d at 212; see also Borer, 563 P.2d at 866 (stating that a
surviving victim can and should vindicate his family's rights against the tortfeasor
through his own action).
164. This disregards for the moment, of course, that under Illinois law, loss of
consortium damages generally may not be recovered in products liability suits. See
supra note 145.
165. Commenting on Justice Clark's concurring opinion in Dralle, the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois stated that his "opinion strikes this
Court as both cogent and persuasive, and if it were free to decide the issue from first principles it would likely adopt [his] views." Alber v. Illinois Dept. of Mental Health, 786
F. Supp. 1340, 1365 (N.D. I11. 1992); see also Hutson v. Bell, 702 F. Supp. 212, 214
(N.D. I11. 1988).
166. See supra parts IV.A.I-4.
167. See supra part IV.A.I.
168. See Dralle, 529 N.E.2d at 213; see also supra note 67 and accompanying text.
169. See Dralle, 529 N.E.2d at 213; see also supra note 67 and accompanying text.
170. "[Tlhis court has never held that ... loss of society ... [damages are] always
compensable. Rather, it has proceeded on a case-by-case basis when determining
whether plaintiffs may recover damages for this type of. . . injury." Seef v. Sutkus, 583
N.E.2d 510, 512 (Ill. 1991) (Miller, C.J., concurring); see also supra note 102 and
accompanying text. In considering the argument that recognizing the children's claim
would permit "maiden aunts" and "second cousins" to recover, the Michigan Court of
Appeals observed that "[tihis make-weight argument has probably been made whenever
a new cause of action was proposed." Berger v. Weber, 267 N.W.2d 124, 129 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1978), modified, 303 N.W.2d 424 (Mich. 1981). But see Frank I. Powers, Note,
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Second, recognizing the children's claim will not flood Illinois
courts with litigation. The decisions of courts that recognize the
children's claim show that permitting the claim will not significantly
increase the number of lawsuits.'
The Dralle court failed to
recognize that it could easily avoid this problem by requiring joinder of
the parent's consortium claim with the child's suit for personal
injuries. 72
Third, juries can adequately calculate loss of consortium damages
despite the intangible nature of such damages. The Dralle court urged
that both the intangible nature of the consortium claim and the potential
for a double recovery rendered loss of consortium damages too difficult to calculate.173 This argument, however, ignores that juries
routinely award damages for intangible injuries, such as for physical
pain or severe mental distress. 74 Significantly, Illinois juries already
valuate spousal and filial consortium in wrongful death Suits. 7 5
Moreover, courts can easily avoid double recovery by requiring
mandatory joinder of the parent's and child's claims and jury
instruc76
tions that explain the separate components of their damages. 1
Fourth, Illinois courts must not leave to the General Assembly
issues more properly decided by the judiciary, such as expansion or
interpretation of the common law. 177 Rather, Illinois courts should
actively police the common law. Although in Dralle the supreme court
failed to discuss whether deference to the General Assembly barred it
from recognizing the children's claim, the appellate court in Koskela
reasoned that the General Assembly, rather than the judiciary, must

Dralle v. Ruder: Did the Decision Close the Book on Recovery for Society and
Companionship in Illinois or Just Turn the Page?, 22 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 721, 730
(1989) (agreeing with the decision in Dralle to avoid expansion of liability by limiting
recovery to the injured).
171. See supra part IV.A.2.
172. Such a requirement should not be considered unreasonable. The Illinois Supreme
Court required joinder of a spouse's claim for loss of consortium with the injured
spouse's claim for personal injury in Brown v. Metzger, 470 N.E.2d 302, 304 (I11.
1984). Illinois' joinder requirement, as articulated in Brown, mirrors that in
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 693(2) (1977).
173. Dralle, 529 N.E.2d at 213; see also supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text.
174. See Dwork, supra note 27, at 734.
175. See infra notes 185-91 and accompanying text.
176. See supra parts IV.A.2, IV.A.3.b.
177. See David H. Hollander et al., Survey: Developments in Maryland Law, 198889, 49 MD. L. REV. 509, 811 (1990) ("By refusing to address [an] issue, [courts ignore
their] 'responsibility to face a difficult legal question and accept judicial responsibility
for a needed change in the common law."' (quoting Hay v. Medical Ctr. Hosp., 496 A.2d
939, 945 (Vt. 1985))).
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expand the consortium claim. 7 '
Illinois courts should not wait for the General Assembly to reform
the common law. 79 Busy legislatures often lack the time and
resources to consider reforms of the common law and may fail to do
so when no influential interest group promotes such reform. 8 ° Illinois
courts should, therefore, recognize the children's claim.' 8 ' The Illinois
the
Supreme Court has expanded tort liability without approval from
82
General Assembly before and should not hesitate to do so now.
4. Illinois' Current Position Conflicts with Earlier Decisions
The Illinois courts' denial of the children's claim conflicts with
earlier Illinois decisions. As stated earlier, the distinction between fatal
and nonfatal injury is a distinction without a difference. 83 When a
parent suffers a severely disabling injury, any distinction between the
effect of that injury and the effect of death on the parent-child relationship becomes meaningless.' 84 Consequently, to the extent that Illinois
courts permit children to recover loss of consortium damages for a
parent's death, they act inconsistently by denying consortium recovery
for severe nonfatal injury.
178. Koskela, 414 N.E.2d at 1150; see also supra note 46 and accompanying text.
179. See supra note 142.
180. See Michael M. Neltner, Ohio Rejects a Child's Cause of Action for Loss of
Parental Consortium: High v. Howard, 592 N.E.2d 818 (Ohio 1992), 61 U. CIN. L. REV.
1097, 1133 (1993) (stating that legislatures traditionally respond slowly when a needed
change in the common law will affect only a small number of constituents).
18 1. Even if the General Assembly disagrees with a judicial expansion of the consortium claim, it remains free to reverse or modify that expansion by statute. For example,
the General Assembly at ILL. COMP. STAT. ch. 735, § 5/2-1116 (West 1993), modified
the holding in Alvis v. Ribar, 421 N.E.2d 886 (I11. 1981) (abolishing contributory
negligence in favor of comparative negligence); see also Ferriter v. Daniel O'Connell's
Sons, Inc., 413 N.E.2d 690, 695-96 (Mass. 1980) (stating that courts should modify the
common law without regard to possible legislative reversal); cf. FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 768.0415 (West Supp. 1994) (reversing the Florida Supreme Court's denial of the
children's claim in Zorzos v. Rosen, 467 So. 2d 305 (Fla. 1985)).
182. The Illinois Supreme Court has stated:
We find no wisdom in abdicating to the legislature our essential function of reevaluating common-law concepts in the light of present day realities. Nor do
we find judicial sagacity in continually looking backward and parroting the
words and analyses of other courts so as to embalm for posterity the legal
concepts of the past.
Dini v. Naiditch, 170 N.E.2d 881, 892 (I11. 1960) (expanding consortium damages to
wives for nonfatal injury to their husbands); see also Elliott v. Willis, 442 N.E.2d 163,
168 (I11. 1982) (construing "pecuniary injury" under Illinois' Wrongful Death Act to
include loss of consortium); Alvis, 421 N.E.2d at 896-97 (abolishing contributory
negligence in favor of comparative negligence).
183. See supra part IV.B.2.
1 84. See supra text accompanying note 160.
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The Illinois Supreme Court first permitted recovery of loss of
consortium damages in wrongful death actions in Elliott v. Willis.'85
The Elliott court held that pecuniary injury under the Wrongful Death
Act includes lost spousal consortium. 86 Next, in Bullard v. Barnes,8 '
the supreme court built upon Elliott by recognizing a rebuttable
presumption of parents' loss of filial consortium for the wrongful
death of a minor child. 88 Furthermore, in Ballweg v. City of
Springfield,'89 the supreme court approved the same presumption of
lost consortium for the wrongful death of an adult child.' 90 Although
the supreme court has not yet directly decided the converse question of
whether children may recover loss of consortium damages for the
wrongful death of a parent, the Illinois appellate courts have permitted
children to so recover.' 9 Since children in Illinois may recover
parental consortium in wrongful death actions, Illinois courts act
inconsistently by denying children recovery for loss of parental
consortium because of nonfatal injuries that have virtually the same
effect as death.
On a more immediate note, the Illinois courts' failure to recognize
the children's claim conflicts with two recent decisions of the Illinois
Supreme Court. In Seef v. Sutkus, 192 the supreme court held that
parents enjoy a rebuttable presumption of lost consortium for the
wrongful death of a viable stillborn child.' 93 The Seef court determined that the relationship between parent and unborn child is worthy
of legal protection' 94 and held that juries could adequately determine
damages to that relationship despite its intangible and underdeveloped
nature.195
185. 442 N.E.2d 163 (111. 1982).
186. Id. at 168.
187. 468 N.E.2d 1228 (I11.
1984).
188. Id. at 1234.
189. 499 N.E.2d 1373 (111. 1986).
190. Id. at 1379.
191. See, e.g., Jackson v. Pellerano, 569 N.E.2d 167, 172-73 (I11.
App. Ct.), appeal
denied, 575 N.E.2d 915 (I11.
1991); Adams v. Turner, 555 N.E.2d 1040, 1043-44 (111.
App. Ct. 1990); Cooper v. Chicago Transit Auth., 505 N.E.2d 1239, 1244 (111. App. Ct.
1987).
192. 583 N.E.2d 510 (I11.
1991).
193. Id. at 512. The plaintiffs in Seef alleged that their obstetrician's failure to
monitor the condition of the unborn child and to perform a timely cesarean delivery
resulted in its death. Id. at 511.
194. Id. at 511. The court stated that logic required it to permit loss of society
damages for the wrongful death of a viable stillborn because it permitted such damages
for infants. Id.
195. Seef, 583 N.E.2d at 514 (Miller, C.J., concurring). "While damages for loss of
society are not as susceptible to in-depth analysis and calculation as future earnings,
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The decision in Seef makes the Illinois courts' refusal to recognize
the children's claim appear even more unjust. In Seef, the supreme
court expanded consortium recovery for impairment of a relationship
whose existence is difficult to discern. 9 6 If the court permitted
recovery of consortium damages where the filial relationship has not
yet developed, it should permit children to recover for loss of parental
consortium because of nonfatal injury. 97 Additionally, in light of the
Seef court's confidence that juries can calculate damages for loss of
consortium between parents and fetuses,' 98 can anyone doubt that
juries can adequately perform "the sensitive, and perhaps impossible,
task"' 99 of quantifying the diminution of the parent-child relationship
caused by nonfatal injury?
Furthermore, in In re Estate of Finley2°° the Illinois Supreme Court
held that siblings may recover proven2 ' 1 loss of consortium damages
in wrongful death actions. 202 Thus, iin Finley, the court extended loss
of consortium damages .to collateral relatives. This expansion makes
the denial of the children's claim appear more unjust because the
parent-child relationship involves greater emotional and financial
dependence and thus deserves greater protection than the relationship
between siblings. The relationship between siblings, although important, generally lacks the intensity of the parent-child relationship.
Consequently, if Illinois courts permit siblings to recover proven loss
of consortium damages in wrongful death actions, children should be
allowed to recover loss of consortium damages for nonfatal injury to
their parents. Society benefits more from a healthy filial relationship
they are 'not immeasurable,' and a jury is capable of assigning monetary value to this
element of pecuniary injury." Id. (Miller, C.J., concurring) (quoting Elliott v. Willis,
442 N.E.2d 163, 168 (111.1982)).
196. One commentator noted: "Seef has restored the pre-Bullard importance of the
presumption [of lost society] by extending it from a relationship whose pecuniary value
is difficult to estimate to a relationship whose existence is difficult to determine." Harry
Poulos, Comment, Is There Consortium Before Birth? Expanding the Availability of
Loss of Society Damages in Wrongful Death Actions, 24 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 559, 578
(1993) (footnote omitted).
197. One should note that frequently no meaningful distinction exists between injury
that causes the death of an unborn child and injury that causes severe nonfatal injury.
See supra part IV.B.2.
198. 583 N.E.2d at 514-15 (Miller, C.J., concurring) (citing Elliott v. Willis, 442
N.E.2d 163, 168 (Ill. 1982)).
199. Dralle, 529 N.E.2d at 213; see also supra text accompanying note 69.
200. 601 N.E.2d 699 (111.1992).
201. Id. at 703. The court in Finley declined to extend a presumption of lost society
to siblings. Id. at 702.
202. Id. at 703. The plaintiffs in Finley alleged that the defendant's negligent operation of a truck caused the death of a six-year-old t child. Id. at 699.
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and therefore should offer it greater protection.2 3
Moreover, the Dralle court based its decision on a questionable
distinction between direct and indirect interference with the filial
relationship. 2°4 The court distinguished the facts before it from those
in Dymek v. Nyquist.20 5 In Dymek, an Illinois Appellate Court
permitted a father to recover loss of consortium damages for the intentional impairment of his relationship with his son.20 6 In Dymek, the
Drallecourt noted, the defendant's tortious acts directly deprived the
plaintiff of his son's society. °7 Yet, the defendants' acts in Dralle
208
indirectly deprived the plaintiff parents of their son's consortium.
The Dralle court found this distinction between direct and indirect
impairment of the filial relationship significant; consequently, it denied
recovery for indirect impairment of the parent-child relationship. 2°9
203. Studies show that impairment of the parent-child relationship negatively affects
the child's personality and development. See, e.g., PAUL H. MUSSEN ET AL., CHILD
DEVELOPMENT AND PERSONALITY 492-94 (3d ed. 1969) (reporting that parental absence
negatively affects children by causing emotional disorders, delinquency and poor
academic performance); David R. Dietrich, Psychological Health of Young Adults Who
Experienced Early Parent Death: MMPI Trends, 40 J. CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 901, 901
(1984) (stating that early parental death may have substantial negative effects); Joan
McCord et al., Some Affects of PaternalAbsence on Male Children, 64 J. ABNORMAL &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 361 (1962) (noting that many studies document the negative effect of
paternal absence); Alec Roy, Specificity of Risk Factors for Depression, 138 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 959, 961 (1981) (stating that childhood parental loss contributed to adult
depression); Psychological Problems and Parental Loss, 113 Sci. NEWS 21, 21 (1978)
(reporting that those receiving psychotherapy often suffered a childhood parental loss).
204. Dralle, 529 N.E.2d at 214-15.
205. Id. (discussing Dymek v. Nyquist, 469 N.E.2d 659 (III. App. Ct. 1984)).
206. Dymek, 469 N.E.2d at 666. The plaintiff in Dymek was a divorced father who
alleged that his former wife took their nine-year-old son to see the defendant psychiatrist for treatment and that the psychiatrist brainwashed the son. Id. at 661. The
complaint in Dymek originally alleged that the defendant "alienate[d] and destroy[ed]"
the son's affections, but was amended to allege that the acts complained of tended "to
injure and destroy the society and companionship" of the minor child. Id. at 661-62.
The plaintiff in Dymek apparently amended his complaint because the Alienation of
Affections Act, ILL. COMP. STAT. ch. 740, § 5/4 (West 1993), bars recovery of loss of
consortium damages in alienation of affections suits.
207. Dralle. 529 N.E.2d at 214.
208. Id. In Dralle, the son's physical and mental injuries directly resulted from the
defendants' acts, but the parents' loss of consortium only resulted indirectly. Id.
209. Id. at 214-15. The court in Dralle otherwise offered no criticism of Dymek,
suggesting its partial approval of loss of consortium damages in cases of nonfatal
injury. PROSSER & KEETON notes the disparate legal treatment of direct and indirect
impairment of relationships:
[T]hough such intangible values are recognized, they are not afforded the same
degree of protection in every case. Where companionship and affection are
interfered with indirectly, through physical injury to a family member, the
more traditional view affords somewhat less protection than where the interference is directly aimed at the relationship itself ....
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The distinction between direct and indirect impairment, however,
cannot justify the supreme court's decision in Dralle. As with the
spousal/filial and the fatal/nonfatal injury distinctions, the distinction
between direct and indirect impairment of the filial relationship is not
persuasive. Parents or children suffer loss of consortium regardless of
whether a defendant's tortious acts directly or indirectly caused their
loss. 210 Consequently, Illinois courts should not deny the children's

claim on the basis of a distinction between direct and indirect impairment of the filial relationship.
V. PROPOSAL

Illinois courts should permit children to recover for lost parental
consortium in cases of nonfatal injury, just as they permit such recovery in cases of wrongful death. Quite simply, no meaningful distinction exists between the effects that death and severe nonfatal injury
have on the filial relationship. 21' Nor does any distinction between the
marital and filial relationships justify providing less protection to the
filial relationship.212 By permitting such recovery for loss of consortium, Illinois courts would more fully protect the parent-child
relationship and also make Illinois law more consistent.
An obvious objection to the children's claim is that it could permit
children to recover loss of consortium damages when the parent's
injuries fail to impair the filial relationship. Admittedly, in most cases
the injury will not be severe enough to deprive the child of the parent's
society or companionship.213 But in some cases, such as when the
parent suffers severe brain damage, the child obviously will lose the
parent's love, guidance and affection.2 4 The task for Illinois courts,
therefore, is to fashion a remedy that permits children 21to
recover for
5
lost.
truly
is
consortium
when
only
consortium
parental
& KEETON, supra note 6, § 124, at 916.
2 10. The Illinois Appellate Court in Dralle considered it "anomalous" to permit
consortium recovery in Dymek and Bullard but not in that case. Dralle, 500 N.E.2d at
516.
211. See supra part IV.B.2.
212. See supra part W.B.1.
213. Berger v. Weber, 267 N.W.2d 124, 128 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978) (explaining that
although the vast majority of parental injuries will not impair the filial relationship,
some severe injuries undoubtedly will deprive children of parental consortium).
214. Id.
215. Note that the Florida statute authorizing children's recovery for loss of parental
consortium because of nonfatal injury requires "significant permanent injury." FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 768.0415 (West Supp. 1994); see also supra note 137 for the text of that
statute.
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Establishing a presumption of lost parental consortium would
provide such a remedy. As in wrongful death actions, defendants
could rebut the presumption of lost filial consortium by proving that
the parent's injuries were not so severe as to impair the parent-child
relationship or that the parent and child were estranged. Estrangement
from the parent will arise most often with consortium claims brought
by adult children. 1 6 A rebuttable presumption of lost filial consortium
will thus protect the filial relationship but also protect defendants by
permitting them to challenge and overcome exaggerated claims of
injury.
It is tempting to limit the presumption of lost filial consortium to
minor children because they generally depend on their parents much
more than do adult children. Since Ballweg authorizes recovery for
loss of consortium for the wrongful death of an adult child,1 7 Illinois
courts should permit adult children to recover loss of consortium
damages for severe nonfatal injury to their parents. Permitting adult
children such a recovery recognizes that many adult children enjoy
close and significant relationships with their parents. Indeed, disabled
children often depend financially and emotionally on their parents
throughout life.
Moreover, Dralle and Koskela should not discourage Illinois courts
from recognizing the children's claim. Adverse precedent has not
discouraged other jurisdictions from so doing. For example, in High
v. Howard,218 the Ohio Supreme Court denied the children's claim.219
One year later, in Gallimore v. Children'sHospitalMedical Center,220
that court expressly overruled High, permitting children to recover for
loss of parental consortium because of nonfatal injury.22' Since
Illinois courts recognize that stare decisis should not inhibit reform of
the common law, they
are free to recognize the children's claim despite
222
precedent.
adverse

216. With respect to viable stillborn infants, however, the supreme court in Seef
essentially created an irrebuttable presumption of lost filial society because of the
impossibility of proving estrangement. See supra notes 192-99 and accompanying
text.
217. Ballweg v. City of Springfield, 499 N.E.2d 1373, 1379 (I11.
1986).
218. 592 N.E.2d 818 (Ohio 1992).
219. Id. at 821.
220. 617 N.E.2d 1052 (Ohio 1993).
221. Id. at 1060.
222. "[S]tare decisis cannot be so rigid as to incapacitate a court in its duty to
develop the law." Alvis v. Ribar, 421 N.E.2d 886, 896 (I11.
1981).
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VI. CONCLUSION
Denial of the children's claim conflicts with earlier Illinois decisions, Illinois' approach to consortium recovery in wrongful death
actions, and the emerging trend in other states. Additionally, any
distinction between filial and marital relationships, or between fatal and
nonfatal injury, cannot justify disparate legal protection. Many courts
that deny the children's claim acknowledge the value of the parentchild relationship and agree that it merits protection. 223 This recognition demonstrates that the parent-child relationship is valuable in its
own right and therefore merits legal protection.224 Accordingly,
Illinois courts should fully protect the filial relationship by permitting
children to recover loss of consortium damages for severe nonfatal
injuries to their parents.225
MATTHEW BRADY

223. See supra note 92.
224. See Green, supra note 13, at 66 (discussing relational interests). In fact,
"[slome [relational interests] are modem society's substitute for property." Id.
225. It would also be appropriate, of course, if the Illinois General Assembly
followed the example of the Florida Legislature by enacting a statute recognizing
children's right to recover for loss of parental consortium because of nonfatal injury.
See supra note 137.

